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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1993 Supp).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court correct in ruling that the "sudden and
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion found in
Omaha Indemnity's Comprehensive General Liability Policy is
unambiguous and that "sudden" has a temporal aspect of
abruptness?
Standard of Review
Since the trial court heard testimony on Omaha Indemnity

Company's ("Omaha") Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, it entered judgment in
conformance with the evidence presented, and issued Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in accordance with a
Memorandum Decision.

(R. 1891-1892.) An Order was entered

granting judgment in favor of Chicago Insurance Company
("Chicago") that incorporated by reference the Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law and the Entry of Judgment entered on
behalf of Omaha (R. 1936-1937), while an order granting partial
summary judgment was entered in favor of Utah Property and
Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (the "Guaranty
Association") on behalf of Carriers Insurance Company
("Carriers") and summary judgment was entered in favor of Zurich
Insurance Company ("Zurich").

(R. 1958-1960.)

Therefore, the

applicable standard of review for- either situation is set forth
below:
1

Whether the terms of the contract are ambiguous is a
question of law; the Court therefore reviews a trial court's
conclusion under a correctness standard.

Anesthesiologists

Associates of Qgden v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 852 P.2d 1031,
1035 (Utah App. 1993); Klas v. Van Wagoner. 829 P.2d 135, 138
(Utah App. 1992); Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah
1985).
On a summary judgment, the appellate court gives no
particular deference to the trial court's conclusions.
Nevertheless, summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party, the
prevailing party is still entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah

1990); Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. 771 P.2d
1100, 1102 (Utah App. 1989).
2.

Was the trial court correct in holding that the release of
gasoline from LaSal's underground pipeline was not sudden?
Standard of Review
A conclusion of law is reviewed by the appellate court

"under a correction of errors standard."

Barnard v. Utah State

Bar. 857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1993); Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
A summary judgment is reviewed to determine "whether there
is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is
not, whether the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a
2

matter of law.H

Gridlev Associates Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins.

Co., 828 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah App. 1992); Thornock v. Cook, 704
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979).
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
At Trial Court.
Omaha, the Guaranty Association, Chicago and Zurich
(collectively referred to as the "insurers") hereby adopt and
incorporate by reference the Statement of the Case set forth in
Appellant's Brief, pages 3 through 9.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
For purposes of this appeal only, and for the sake of
judicial economy, the insurers hereby adopt the Statement of
Facts set forth in LaSal's Appellant's Brief at 9 through 21,
subject to the corrections, clarifications, and additions to the
following pertinent numbered paragraphs.
39.

As a clarification of Dr. Pitt's testimony, insurers

add the following:
Dr. Pitt testified at the evidentiary hearing that the
particular piece of pipe (plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P) exhibited the
characteristics of general corrosion as well as pitting
corrosion.

The basic deterioration and overall rusted appearance

of the pipe was due to general corrosion.

The localized area

where corrosion had proceeded more rapidly than other areas was
due to pitting corrosion.

(R. 3245.)
3

Further, Dr. Pitt

testified that a mill (the thickness of the corroded metal) is
equal to 1,000th of an inch.
42.

(R. 3236.)

The following facts should be added to Appellant's

paragraph 42 of Statement of Facts in order to clarify Dr. Pitt's
testimony:
Dr. Pitt offered the following testimony concerning the
cause of the leak in the section of pipe, Exhibit 1-P:
You see a pipe that's had extensive corrosion on
the outside of the pipe. Could be designated as pitting
type corrosion/ but there is also considerable general
corrosion on it.

Pitting corrosion is corrosion that occurs in a
localized area, as contrasted to general corrosion over
all the surface.

The process that I visualize that occurred . . .
is that the corrosion likely occurred as a result of
what we call straight current corrosion . . . and in
this case, the corrosion occurred in a number of
localized areas. The corrosion proceeded to continue
until at some point in time the metal was thin enough
to burst suddenly from the inside pressure of the pipe.
And in my opinion that's what caused at least one of
the holes present.

Simply the metal is not strong enough to hold the
interior pressure.
R. 3234-3235.
43.

As a clarification to Appellant's Statement of Facts

paragraph 43, insurers add the following:
Dr. Pitt testified as follows:
4

If the pipe were not under pressure, I believe the leak
would have also been sudden because at one instance
it's there and then the next instance it's not there
and then it's there.
R. 3238.

In Dr. Pitt's opinion, whether due to a corrosion

failure or a failure due to an accident such as a backhoe
striking a pipe, every failure would be considered sudden.
(R. 3254; 3297.)
44.

In addition and in clarification to the limited facts

set forth in Appellant's Statement of Facts paragraph 449
insurers add the following:
Following the exchange set forth in Appellant's Brief
between Dr. Alex and LaSal's counsel, Dr. Alex testified that he
did not consider the leak in this case sudden.

He further opined

that the first movement of two or three molecules did not
encompass a sudden failure.

(R. 3290.)

Dr. Alex testified that

the initial release of gasoline from inside a pipe that has
failed due to corrosion would be "in the form of very minute
amounts, a few atoms, osmotic, for all intents and purposes."
(R. 3271.)

After the first transgression of fluid in the form of

atoms, "the first indication would be a slight wetting of the
surface on the outside [of the pipe] in line with these thread
roots."

(Id.)

In his opinion, this type of leak typically would

progress from simply moisture on the outside to drops forming in
a matter of days to weeks, and from a few drops to a gradual

5

trickle of gasoline over a matter of weeks to months.

(R. 3271-

3272.)
Additionally, Dr. Alex stated that there was no indication
of an internally-caused stress fracture on the pipe because he
would expect in the case of such stress fracture, to see a sharp
line in the form of a crack, which was not present on Exhibit 1P.

(R. 3277.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The pollution exclusion under the policies in question

clearly and unambiguously precludes coverage for any discharge of
pollutants into the environment, unless the discharge is "sudden
and accidental."

This Court has joined the other jurisdictions

that have adopted the "more well-reasoned view" that the "sudden
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion is
unambiguous and has held that the word "sudden" "must have a
temporal aspect to its meaning and not just a sense of something
unexpected." Gridley Associates, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
828 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah App. 1992).
This Court reviewed the differing views of the pollution
exclusion in Gridley and does not need to re-examine the issue
whether "sudden" is unambiguous.

"xSudden' within the vsudden

and accidental' clause cannot be defined without reference to the
temporal element, specifically immediacy, abruptness, and
quickness."

Id.

6

The Gridlev decision clearly distinguished between a
discharge resulting from a "clean break" of a gasoline dispenser
line that is "caused by an adjustment of the area in which it is
in" and a break "caused by corrosion or deterioration which would
have resulted in a gradual drip or trickle of gasoline from the
line."

Id.

A clean break is deemed sudden, but a discharge of

the type found in our case, namely a corrosively caused slow
seepage leak, cannot be deemed sudden.
LaSal erroneously argues that any discharge, whether
corrosively caused or caused by a classical break in the line, is
sudden and, therefore, within the exception to the pollution
exclusion.

These insurers respectfully submit that such an

interpretation would eviscerate the meaning of "sudden" in the
pollution exclusion and render it mere surplusage.
clearly rejects this approach.

Gridley

Therefore, because this

corrosively caused discharge cannot be deemed "sudden", the
judgments dismissing LaSal's action against these insurers should
be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND
PRECLUDES COVERAGE UNDER THE INSURERS'
POLICIES.

7

The pollution exclusion contained in the Omaha Policy1
excludes coverage for:
bodily injury or property damage arising out
of the discharge . . . of vapors . . . fumes
. . . liquids or gases . . . or other
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land . . . or other course or body of
water; but this exclusion does not apply if
the discharge . . . is sudden and accidental.
R. 1898 (emphasis added).
As acknowledged by LaSal in its Appellant's Brief, this
Court has held in Gridlev that "sudden" in the "sudden and
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion in a
comprehensive general liability policy of insurance is
unambiguous.
A.

Appellant's Brief at 23.

Well established rules of contract interpretation

require the Court to give full effect to both "sudden and
accidental."
Under Utah law the question of a contract's ambiguity is a
question of law.

Gridley, 828 P.2d at 526, (quoting Crowther v.

Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Faulkner v.
Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983))).

Insurance

contracts are construed according to general contract principles
and are, therefore, subject to the same rules of construction.
Village Inn Apts, v. State Farm, 790 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1990).
x

The policies of the other insurers joining in this brief are
either identical to or follow form of the Omaha Policy. Therefore,
all references to Omaha's Policy apply to all other insurers'
policies.

8

Utah law c l e a r l y s t a t e s
ni i »i ni st ri if M I iij.iiiii 1 I

that

an i iisiirance p o l i c y

ni ni ni ni in .Li IIIM

is t o be

in mi Ih; lull in in I In r m ill inn I i i iiiitbiyijcnm ,

A t l a s Corp. v . C l o v i s N a t . Bank,

737 P . 2 d 2 2 5 r

229 (Ut.iii 1987)

( c i t i n g B i g B u t t e Ranch v . Holme, 57 0 F ** - ^ i
x n s . JuiiC-i.tv^.ii.M'-

Fire

* o ^ »„

Utah r u ; e s o f c o n t : -JI - i n t e r p r e t a t JU
o b j e c t i v e and r e a s o n a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n be A p p l i e d t o f h o c o n t r a c t
+• y

in-ih s t a t e Med, A s s o c ,

u. Utah S t a t e

C r e d i t U n i o n , 655 P . 2 d 6 4 3 , 646 (III I I ill 1 9 8 2 ) .
i n t e r p r e t e d by llt.dli c o u r t s
onJiiif,i»y

"i

ll|(.

, . I ' M . seiibi",,

1^ i | i v i n q
i

A p o l i c y i s t o be

i t s words

IIMI.AI|I.

i"

r » | i> Vi 1 10 *S

(11111 p I, * i M | i , l a r k v , ^ l u d e n L i d l
257

(1970i

inadmissible
o

i imiin I.Iluuubiguous .

T h r i f t and Loan,

8 J B P . 2 d I 116

denied,

4 ih. ( U t a h

1997),

mi mi HI ml

i y n u i mi

MI In I ,

interpreting contractual terms.
Club
i:Li.lt

u.LLe
'

person

Draughon v .

11 ' i

l l 'H!9)

I" ,

I I i

/11

^

generally

fn d l n l e r i i i n p fhf? i n t e n t o f the i i a r t i e s
ni i 11 ni

plain,

( I l t n l i Ap|i

I i b r i n s i c or pari)I e v i d e n c e Is

i n ni i

83 2 •

llflf?

I n s . uu , ,

" 1 ho i r

, '

w i t h o r d i n a r y undez'standing would c o n s t r u e ! them
CUNA M u t . I n s . S o c i e t y ,

Employee's

n If tin

ti'iins

L a r s o n v . Overlund

1 3 1 9 ( U t a h Ami

I "I <II j#

.

I

*' e

Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country

Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 9?R

9 2 9 (] 9 6 2 )

Finally

H I '•»

nil mi fMju in: v i,he C o u r I: t ::: ha rmonize contractual

provisions in order to give all terms full effect

9

See Vance v.

Arnold, 114 Utah 463, 201 P.2d 475 (1949); G.G.A. Inc. v.
Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989).
Thus, Utah law clearly requires courts to determine the
ordinary and plain meaning of "sudden" in the context of the
insurance policy and in conjunction with "accidental," and not in
the abstract.

Any departure from these interpretative rules, as

implied by LaSal's arguments, should not be countenanced.
B.

Appellant's argument that the "sudden and accidental"

exception to the pollution exclusion is ambiguous ignores clear
policy language.
LaSal primarily argues that "sudden" is susceptible to more
than one reasonable meaning.

Appellant's Brief at 24.

It argues

that "sudden" can mean either "abrupt or immediate" or
"unexpected."

Id.

LaSal urges the Court to follow the cases

that have found the exception to the pollution exclusion to be
ambiguous and therefore, interpreted in favor of coverage.

See,

e.g., Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d
603 (1980); Clausen v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380
S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1979).

Because of such alleged ambiguity, LaSal

argues that the Court must ignore the clear terms of the
exception to the pollution exclusion which allow coverage for
damages arising from polluting discharges only when they are both
sudden and accidental.

LaSal's approach, while ingenious,

violates the basic rules of Utah law which prohibits a court from
10
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By their very nature, dictionaries define words in
the abstract, whereas here, we must ascertain
whether the word "sudden" is ambiguous in the
context of the specific insurance policy.
Hartford, 962 F.2d at 1489 (quoting New Castle Country, 933 F.2d
at 1194).
Hartford further quoted New Castle Country which ruled that
"conflicting precedent, while relevant, did not xautomatically
mandate a finding of ambiguity'".

Hartford, 962 F.2d at 1489

(quoting Newcastle Country at 1196).
Recent cases in other jurisdictions support this basic rule
of policy interpretation.

The Supreme Court of Florida in

Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., No.
78# 293, 1993 WL 241520 (Fla. July 1, 1993)2 acknowledged that
dictionaries may be helpful "insofar as they set forth the
ordinary, usual meaning of words.

However/ as noted in New

Castle Country v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., dictionaries
are ximperfect yardsticks of ambiguity.'"
Castle Country, 933 F.2d at 1193-94).

Id. at 9 (quoting New

The Florida Supreme Court

stated that its duty was "to determine whether the word %sudden'
is ambiguous in the context of the specific insurance policy at
issue."

Id. (emphasis added).

The existence of multiple dictionary definitions of a word
"is not the sine qua non of ambiguity.
would be unambiguous."

If it were, few words

Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-0

2

A copy is attached in Appendix.
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Id. at 527. That conclusion is consistent

with the general rules of contractual interpretation set forth
above.
This Court recognized the insightful analysis of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts by quoting Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v.
Belleville Industries, Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 555 NE.2d 568, 572
(1990) cert, denied,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 969 (1992):

For the word "sudden" to have any significant
purpose, and not to be surplusage when used
generally in conjunction with the word
"accidental," it must have a temporal aspect
to its meaning, and not just the sense of
something unexpected. We hold, therefore,
that when used in describing a release of
pollutants, "sudden" in conjunction with
"accidental" has a temporal element. The
issue is whether the release was sudden. The
alternative is that it was gradual. If the
release was abrupt and also accidental, there
is coverage for an occurrence arising out of
the discharge of pollutants.
Gridlev, 828 P.2d at 527.
Thus, this Court held that it has adopted the "more wellreasoned view of jurisdictions holding the pollution exclusion to
be unambiguous and that sudden has a temporal element,
K

specifically immediacy, abruptness, and quickness.'"

527.

Id. at

All other courts interpreting this exception to the

pollution exclusion clause, applying Utah law, have reached the
same conclusion.3
3

See Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chemical Co., 990 F.2d
1175 (10th Cir. 1993) (affirming United States District Court for
the District of Utah decision finding pollution exclusion
14

Judge Rokich, in the case at hand, stated in his Memorandum
Decision that the holding in Gridlev best defines what
constitutes a sudden and accidental discharge.

He adopted the

following language of Judge Russon from Gridley:
[T]he terms "sudden and accidental" are
unambiguous. As commonly used, the meaning
of sudden combines both elements of without
notice or warning and quick or brief in time
. . . sudden connotes a "temporal aspect of
immediacy, abruptness, swiftness, quickness,
instantaneous and brevity."
R. 1890 (quoting Gridlev, 828 P.2d at 527 (quoting U.S. Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F.Supp. 437, 446
(D.Kan. 1990), affd. 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993))).
Despite the fact that an ongoing controversy exists among
different jurisdictions, the better-reasoned cases continue to
find "sudden" in the exception to the pollution exclusion to be
unambiguous and to require a temporal element.4

Hence, there is

unambiguous); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992)
(affirming United States District Court, District of Utah decision
holding pollution exclusion unambiguous). Hartford cited the
decision of Judge Winder of the District Court in Anaconda
Minerals, 773 F.Supp. at 1505 n.9, noting that Judge Winder quoted
Sharon Steel v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., no. C-87-2306 and C87-2311 at 28 (3rd Dist. Utah, July 20, 1988) as follows:
"[W]ithout referring to dictionaries, case law or parol evidence,
av reasonably prudent person would interpret vsudden' as including
temporal condition of being instantaneous and abrupt'". Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 962 F.2d at 1490 n.7.
4

See list of cases cited in ACL Technologies, Inc. v.
Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Cal.App.4th 1773, 22
Cal.Rptr.2nd 206, 209-211 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1993), petition for
review denied
Cal.Rptr.2nd
(Cal. 1993).
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no reason for this Court to re-analyze this issue since that
decision has already properly been made in Gridley in accordance
with the principles of contractual interpretation firmly
established by Utah case law.

The trial court's judgments in our

case on appeal were consistent with this Court's holding in
Gridlev and should, therefore, be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT
THE RELEASE OF THE GASOLINE FROM LASAL'S
UNDERGROUND LINE WAS NOT SUDDEN.
In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Rokich concluded that
Gridley, supra, Mis the case that best defines what constitutes a
sudden and accidental discharge."

(R. 1890.)

He adopted

Gridley's language that "sudden connotes a xtemporal aspect of
immediacy, abruptness, swiftness, quickness, instantaneous and
brevity.'"

(R. 1980) (quoting Gridley, 828 P.2d at 527).

The

trial court also adopted Gridley's ruling that the "length of
time that elapses before the leak is discovered or the amount of
discharge does not render the fracture any less sudden," in
situations where a discharge has a sudden inception rather than
one which is gradual. (R. 1891.)
It should be noted for purposes of this appeal that LaSal is
appealing that portion of the trial court's decision that ruled
the pollution exclusion unambiguous, as well as its finding that
the discharge was not sudden.

Insurers understand that LaSal is

not appealing that portion of the trial court's decision holding
16

that the elapsed time between the inception of the leak and its
discovery does not render an otherwise sudden leak any less
sudden.

Therefore, the insurers will not specifically address

this issue, except to the extent that it relates to the
determination of the nature of the discharge, whether sudden or
gradual.5
Most importantly for purposes of this appeal, the trial
court distinguished the facts of the Gridley case from the case
at hand.

Based on the undisputed evidence established through

extensive briefing by the parties as well as an evidentiary
hearing involving qualified metallurgy experts, the trial court
found that the failure of the pipe resulted from the process of
corrosion.

(R. 1899-1901.)

In Gridley, the pipeline leak

resulted from a "clean break" and was, therefore, deemed to be
sudden.

By contrast, the trial court in our case held "that a

leak caused by corrosion is not sudden and accidental."
(R. 1891.)

Therefore, the pollution exclusion applies and

precludes coverage for LaSal.
Despite LaSal's attempts to characterize Gridley's
discussions concerning the difference between a "clean break" and
one caused by corrosion as mere "dicta"6, such comparison of the
5

This does not mean that the insurers necessarily agree with
that premise, but rather, assert that even accepting it, they are
nonetheless entitled to an affirmance of the trial court's judgment
dismissing LaSal's complaint with_prejudice.
6

See Appellant's Brief at 30, 41-42.
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differing causative processes is necessary for a full understanding of the holding of Gridley and should not be disregarded
or reversed.
In Gridley, it was uncontroverted that the "break in the
gasoline line was a xclean break' that vwould have had to have
been caused by an adjustment of the area in which it is in.f"
Id. at 527. No evidence was presented to show that the leak was
caused by corrosion or deterioration "which would have resulted
in a gradual drip or trickle of gasoline from the line."

Id.

Thus, the court found that the "clean break certainly resulted in
an unexpected as well as an immediate and abrupt flow of gasoline
from the severed line" which qualified the discharge as "sudden."
Id.
A.

Gradual is the opposite of sudden.

This Court recognized in Gridley that for "sudden" to have
any significance within the context of the pollution exclusion,
it must refer to a temporal element "specifically immediacy,
abruptness and quickness." Id.
LaSal has attempted to restrict the meaning of "sudden" to
the isolated moment of "initial release" while ignoring both the
causative process and the continuation of the leak.

See

Appellant's Brief at 38. LaSal argues that because the length of
time to discover and the volume of the release are irrelevant,
logic dictates that the Court should only look to the very moment

18

the gasoline left the confinement of the pipe into the
environment.

Such argument is both unrealistic and useless.

If the Court accepted LaSal's argument, the independent
meaning of "sudden", which is the opposite of gradual, would be
eviscerated.

The Court would also be forced to disregard the

long line of cases interpreting the pollution exclusion for both
gasoline leaks, as well as general routine discharges.

If every

discharge were limited to a sterile analysis by characterizing
the initial release from containment into the environment as
sudden, every discrete release could arguably be found to be
sudden.

The only issue left to decide would be whether the

discharge was unexpected or unintended.
The better-reasoned cases which have addressed this question
(most of which have been relied upon by LaSal to construct its
arguments), distinguish between differing causes of leaks as a
means of deciding the true nature of the leaks.

Just as this

Court in Gridley distinguished between the nature of clean breaks
and corrosively-caused leaks in underground lines, the courts in
other jurisdictions have uniformly utilized these distinctions in
analyzing the suddenness of leaks as well.
LaSal has cited Shell Oil v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12
Cal.App. 4th 715, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 815, 841-42 (1993) for the
proposition that "sudden" refers to the commencement of a
discharge but does not require the polluting event to terminate
quickly.

See Appellant's Brief at 33. LaSal failed, however, to
19

point out that the Shell court further stated "[i]f a sudden and
accidental discharge continues for a long time, at some point it
ceases to be sudden or accidental."

Shell, 15 Cal.Rptr. 2d at

842 (citing Lumbermens Mutual Cas. v. Belleville, Ind., 407 Mass.
675, 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 n.6.)7
Furthermore, Shell stated:
We cannot reasonably call "sudden" a process that
occurs slowly and incrementally over a relatively
long time, no matter how unexpected or unintended
the process. A "discharge, dispersal, release or
escape" of pollutants that happens gradually and
continuously for years is not "sudden" in the
ordinary sense of the word. (American Motorists
Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp. (D.Kan. 1987) 667
F.Supp. 1423, 1428-1429, affd. (10th Cir. 1991)
946 F.2d 1482, mod. on rehg. (10th Cir. 1991) 946
F.2d 1489.) Thus, "sudden" necessarily contains a
temporal element in addition to its connotation of
the unexpected.
Shell, 15 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 841 (citations in original).
In a recent decision following Shell, ACL Technologies, Inc.
v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Cal.App.4th 1773,
22 Cal.Rptr.2nd 206 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1993), petition for
review denied

Cal.Rptr.2nd

(Cal. 1993), the California

Court of Appeals held that the pollution exclusion precluded
7

The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated:
We decline to speculate on the proper
construction of the exception, if a release or
discharge, initially both accidental and
sudden, continues for an extended period. As
the discharge or release continues, at some
point, presumably, it would likely cease to be
accidental or sudden (even in the sense of
unexpected).
20

coverage for damages incurred in clean-up of

pollutants which

leaked from rusted and corroded underground storage tanks. After
performing a concise but thorough review of the issue surrounding
the exception to the pollution exclusion, the court ruled that
when applying the framework of rules of contract interpretation
similar to those utilized by Utah courts,
there is no way that we could come to any
other conclusion than that reached in the
Shell Oil decision: that "sudden and
accidental" language in the CGL
[comprehensive general liability policy]
pollution exclusion does not allow for
coverage for gradual pollution.
Id. at 212.
Addressing the very issue before this Court, the court in
ACL Technologies stated:
Giving sudden a meaning independent of
accidental, therefore, requires giving it a
meaning with a temporal aspect - immediacy,
quickness or abruptness - that does not allow
it to cover events, such as happened in this
case - that occurred gradually. We therefore
conclude, in the context of this case, that
"sudden and accidental" unambiguously does
not include gradual pollution.
Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
Even if the Court were to conclude that the phrase "sudden
and accidental" is ambiguous, the trial court's judgments in our
case, as in ACL Technologies, would have to be affirmed for this
reason: "[W]hatever vsudden' means, it does not mean gradual.
The ordinary person would never think that something which
happens gradually also happened suddenly.
21

The words are

antonyms."

Id. at 215.

Because gradual is the opposite of

sudden and because a reasonable and objective person with
ordinary understanding would not expect sudden to cover gradual
pollution, sudden can never mean both "unexpected and gradual."
See, Id. at 215 n.40 & 216 n.42 for insightful and entertaining
illustrations supporting this argument.
Even those cases cited by LaSal which seemingly support its
position, in fact illustrate the insurers' analytical approach.
One cannot determine the nature of the discharge by sterilely
isolating the moment of initial release.
In order to understand the reasoning of the court in Wagner
v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co.. 427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis.App. 1988),
review denied, 436 N.W.2d 30 (Wis. 1988), relied upon heavily by
LaSal, one must understand the facts.

The parties agreed at

oral argument that although the exact cause of the leak was
unknown, the insurer, Milwaukee Mutual, conceded "that in all
probability the leak resulted from a crack in a pipe damaged when
cement footings for the canopy were poured on it, and that this
crack occurred immediately."

Id. at 855 n.2 (emphasis added).

The Wisconsin Appellate Court rejected the insurer's
argument that the discharge was not sudden because the discharge
accumulated over a period of three years.

The court reasoned

that the initial discharge of the gasoline was sudden.

The

gasoline leak began immediately after it was cracked in 1981 and
continued leaking until it was discovered in 1984. Therefore,
22

according to the court, the length of time before the leak was
discovered was irrelevant as it related to the issue of
suddenness.

Id, at 857.

Obviously, the court focused on the nature of the initial
discharge and reasoned that because the leak was caused by an
immediate breaking of the pipe with a single event, as in
Gridley, rather than by a slow, ongoing process of corrosion, it
qualified as a sudden leak.

The court also emphasized that the

sudden status of the leak would only be maintained if the
continuing discharge remained undiscovered.

Id. at 857-858.

Likewise, LaSal has selectively cited Goodman v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 412 Mass. 807, 593 N.E.2d 233 (1992).

Therein, the

parties agreed that an underground gasoline storage tank had been
leaking for 18 months prior to its discovery and removal.
Summary judgment was granted when the trial court found that the
release over 18 months was too lengthy to have been considered
sudden.

Id. at 235.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed

and remanded for the reason that "the record in this case did not
permit an informed resolution whether the leak in question was
abrupt, and therefore, does not establish enough facts to warrant
decision on the "suddenness" issue."

Id. at 235-236.

The court

reaffirmed the holding in Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville
Ind., 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.W.2d 568 (1990) cert, denied,

U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 969 (1992), which held that "the abruptness of the
commencement of the release or discharge of the pollutant is the
23

crucial element in determining whether an event qualifies as
^sudden'."

Goodman, 559 N.E.2d at 235 (quoting Lumbermens, 555

N.E.2d at 572). The Massachusetts court, however, did not
exclusively restrict its analysis to the very moment of the
liquid's discharge into the outside environment, as proposed by
LaSal.

In fact, the court demonstrated a more meaningful

approach as follows:
While the cause of the release does not
determine whether the exception to the
pollution exclusion is applicable, it may
well be informative in deciding whether the
release was abrupt. For example, a sudden
cause (like a pile driven into a gasoline
tank), or the sudden development of a
condition (like a ground shift that ruptures
piping) might guide the decision whether a
given release of pollutants was due to a
momentary event, and therefore, was abrupt.
Id.
In concluding that insufficient evidence had been developed
at trial to determine the cause of the leak, the Goodman court
quoted from plaintiff's expert who opined that the discharge was
not the result of a gradual leak of gasoline from the tank over
an indeterminant period of time, but was an abrupt discharge. Id.
at 236.

Nevertheless, the court noted that the expert's

observations provided no clear explanation of the source of the
hole in the offending tank "or whether the release of pollutants
came about as a result of a condition that developed so rapidly
it could properly be described as. a momentary event."
(citing Gridley).

Id.

Furthermore, there was evidence that gasoline
24

also appeared to have been released from a siphon or riser pipe
connecting the underground tank, and conflicting testimony
existed concerning the extent of the hole in the defective tank.
Id.
As a final illustration of the differing treatment accorded
by courts to pipes that leak as a result of a "sudden event
versus a slowly developing, gradual leak," the Goodman court
stated:
The leak of gasoline from tank no. 2 may have
begun slowly from a crack or small hole in
the tank brought about by its aging, and then
increased over time as the crack or hole
widened. This type of release probably would
not constitute a "sudden" event within the
exception to the pollution clause. However,
it is also possible that the discharge of
pollutants occurred as the result of a sudden
cause or rapidly developing condition . . .
but, until all of the circumstances of the
release in this case are fully developed, no
adequate determination can be made as to
whether the "sudden and accidental" exception
is applicable.
Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
The Goodman decision is consistent with Wagner and Gridlev
in differentiating between a gradually developing leak through
corrosion and one which is abrupt and immediate, arising from a
sudden event causing a "clean break."
Another case cited by LaSal, Petr-all Petroleum Corp. v.
Firemans Ins. Co., 593 N.Y.S.2d 693 (A.D. 4 Dept. 1993) ruled
that an insurer had a duty to defend the owner of a gasoline
station which had leaking underground gasoline pipes, based on
25

the broad duty to defend, since the complaint by a third-party
adjacent homeowner could be interpreted "to allege an accidental
and unexpected leak from a subsurface pipe or tank that continued
undetected for a period of time, an event both sudden and
accidental . . . ."

Id, at 695. The papers submitted

demonstrated that the cause of the leak may have been a break in
the pipeline when a customer drove away from a dispenser before
removing the nozzle from her car.

Id. at 695.

The court stated that the insurer, by relying upon this
specific event as a basis for dismissal, "implicitly conceded
that the complaint" may be interpreted as alleging a sudden and
accidental leak.

Under these circumstances, rather than a leak

resulting "from a repeated or continuous business operation," the
court found a duty to defend.

Id.

There is no evidence in our case to indicate a sudden and
accidental break of the pipeline

in question.

Rather, the leak

arose from the gradual corrosive process and continued its slow
progression over time until its discovery.

(R. 1899, H 23; R.

1901, 1F 10.)
Colonie Motors, Inc. v. Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co., 538
N.Y.S.2d 630 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1989), cited by LaSal, also presents
facts that are inapposite to our case on appeal.

Colonie

involved claims for coverage in the face of the pollution
exclusion where a discharge of waste oil into the environment was
caused when an underground pipe in a waste oil containment unit
26

"cracked."

The court noted that the record was absent of any

suggestion "that plaintiff was aware of either the crack or the
discharge until waste oil was discovered in the ground water of
adjacent property."

The court also noted that routine

maintenance or inspection would presumably not have revealed the
leak (unlike a gasoline tank which is regularly inventoried).
Again, because of the inconclusive nature of the type of
discharge at its inception# the court ruled in favor of the
insured.
The cases discussed above and cited by LaSal demonstrate the
differentiation between a gradual leak resulting from corrosion
and a sudden leak caused by an abrupt or immediate event.
is the opposite of gradual.

Sudden

In order to give effect to the

meaning of "sudden" in applying it to the facts of our case, the
commencement of the leak at the LaSal Station must be analyzed in
its context.

Such analysis clearly demonstrates that it resulted

from a gradual, on-going process of corrosion and continued as a
slow, gradually developing leak thereafter.

On that basis, the

trial court correctly held it to be gradual and non-sudden.
(See R. 1901.)
B.

The evidence establishes that the inception of the leak

resulted from corrosion and that its commencement was gradual and
not sudden.
LaSal's expert, EarthFax Engineering, Inc., has concluded
that the onset of the gasoline release occurred sometime between
27

February, 1983 and September, 1984.
(citing R. 1655-1656).

See Appellant's Brief at 17

The pipe was not uncovered and removed

until approximately January 30, 1986, when the leak was located
and repaired. (R. 3223.)
LaSal's metallurgy expert, Dr. Pitt, in his report drafted
July 15, 1992, submitted as Exhibit 3-P at the evidentiary
hearing (R. 1885), stated that M[v]isual observation of the
coupling shows extensive pitting and corrosion present on its
outside surface."

(Emphasis added.)

Further, Dr. Pitt stated

that "[c]orrosion of the pipe wall produced a situation where the
metal thickness at the thread roots was too small to hold the
interior pressure." Id.

Dr. Pitt roughly calculated that

corrosion had gradually proceeded over time to the point where
the pipe at the place of failure was "about 1.1 mills, at the
time of failure." (R. 3236.)
inch.

A millimeter is a thousandth of an

Dr. Pitt admitted that 1 millimeter would be in the

magnitude of a sheet of paper or even thinner.8

(R. 3253.)

Dr. Franklin Alex, expert metallurgist presented on behalf
of Omaha, agreed with Dr. Pitt that the pipe was thinned to the
point of failure as a result of general and pitting corrosion.
In fact, their only disagreement centered on their interpretation
of whether the actual discharge of the product from the pipe
resulting from corrosion was sudden or gradual.
8

Dr. Alex stated that 1.1 millimeters is about
width" of a piece of paper. (R. 3278, 3287.)
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"half the

It was Dr. Pitt's opinion that there could not be anything
other than a sudden failure of a pipe due to corrosion because,
in his mind, at one moment the pipe is not open, and at the next
moment the product breaks through its containment.
3253-3254.)

(See R. 3242,

In fact, when questioned by Judge Rokich directly,

Dr. Pitt stated that

"the actual happening is where there's a

hole that - at one instant there's a hole and before that there's
no hole and that's my definition of sudden."

(R. 3297.)

In

order to seek a clarification of his testimony, the following
dialogue then took place between Judge Rokich and Dr. Pitt:
The Court:

Let's go back over that so I can-

Witness Pitt:

Kinetics means how fast

something occurs, and that would be how fast
fluid flows through the hole.

I don't care

how fast it flows through the hole.
The Court: So it's just the time that the
penetration occurs?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court:

As the suddenness of the break?

Witness Pitt: Yes.
The Court: Okay.
not the case.

And you're saying that's

R. 3297.
In short, Dr. Pitt utilized a metaphysical approach and
found that the first molecular movement of liquid from inside of
metal, regardless of how badly corroded it might be, to outside
of metal, is always sudden.
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Dr. Alex, in harmony with Dr. Pitt, also believed that the
failure was caused by general and pitting corrosion (R. 3266),
and that the pipe failed in at least five areas coincident with
the thread roots.

(R. 3266.)

Dr. Alex opined as to the cause of

the failures as follows:
They were caused by general and pitting
corrosion. There are then the various
indications. Here are the various degrees of
penetration. You've got anywhere from just
going through to the point where the
corrosion products are still in the
penetration, but you can see the inside
surface to the point where you have the
complete perforation in an elongated
perforation.
R. 3269.
Dr. Alex explained corrosion to be a process that any
metallic substance undergoes when exposed to the environment.
The iron pipe starts corroding and forming oxides which are
represented by the brown or rusting areas on the pipe. (R. 1885,
Exhibit 1-P; see, also, Exhibits 4-D, the photograph of the
pipe.)

Corrosion gradually progresses at different rates in

different areas.

The faster corroding areas form pits, until

finally the material is eaten away to the point where the metal
is thinnest, which, in LaSal's case, was in the thread roots.
(R. 3270.)
According to Dr. Alex, the areas of corroded perforation
generally still have a coating of rust on the inside and outside
and, where underground, are retained by soil and other material.
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Therefore, "the first transgression of fluid would be in the form
of very minute amounts, a few atoms, osmotic, for all intents and
'purposes."

(R. 3271.)

There would initially be a "slight

wetting of the surface on the outside in line with these thread
roots" that would progress at some point in the future to more
perceptible liquid on the outside of the pipe.

Id.

As explained

by Dr. Alex, the time frame involved from the first osmotic
moisture on the outside, to the formation of drops outside the
pipe could take from days to weeks.

It would take from weeks to

months for the few drops to slowly progress to a gradual trickle
of product through the corroded openings.

(R. 3272.)

Despite LaSal's interpretation that the final push through
the corrosively-thinned membrane was the result of a "sudden
impulse of internal pressure," Dr. Alex stated that the discharge
was not due to a sudden failure of the pipe.

He pointed out that

the holes in the pipe were "eaten away on both sides" and showed
signs of gradually enlarging pitting areas that over time would
continue to form a larger hole in surrounding areas.

(R. 3283.)

Furthermore, the photograph of the pipe (Exhibit 4-P) portrays an
area that is covered over with corrosive products that
demonstrates "various degrees of penetration . . . and you still
have . . . some areas where you can see the corroding products,
but the area is not penetrated yet."

(R. 3283.)

In summary, Dr. Alex agreed if you narrowly define sudden as
"the first time one molecule of water moves through that wall
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section" then the leak would be considered sudden.

However, he

stated that he didn't "think that one molecule or two molecules
or three molecules encompasses a sudden failure from a practical
standpoint."

(R. 3290.)

The approach proffered by LaSal through its expert, Dr.
Pitt, takes an unnecessarily restrictive and unrealistic point of
view in determining "sudden" for purposes of the pollution
exclusion.

Under this analysis, all discharges will be subjected

to this microscopic analysis and found to be sudden.

Whether

caused by an abrupt breaking of the line by a backhoe, or arising
from a gradual corrosive process, all leaks, and for that matter,
all discharges would be considered sudden.

This analysis would

have the same effect as defining sudden to mean "unexpected and
unintended."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit rejected this approach:
We are not convinced that the discharges in
this case were brief or momentary. Ray has
argued that each release was sudden, when
viewed in isolation. But under this theory,
all releases would be sudden; one cannot
always isolate a specific moment at which
pollution actually enters the environment.
Rather than pursuing such metaphysical
concepts, we choose to recognize the reality
of Sea Ray's actions in this case.
Ray Industries. Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754,
768-769 (6th Cir. 1992).
There is no dispute between either of the experts, nor in
the record, with the fact that the leak in question resulted from
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a long-term process of corrosion.

The only disagreement between

the experts is the legal conclusion each draws from such
evidence.

To accept LaSal's premise that all leaks are sudden

eviscerates the meaning of sudden, in violation of the general
rules of contractual interpretation firmly established in Utah
law.

For this reason, insurers urge this Court to affirm the

trial court's judgment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct in applying the well-reasoned
decision of Gridlev to the facts of this case in finding that the
pollution exclusion in the Omaha policy precluded coverage for
any of the underlying claims against LaSal.

The "sudden and

accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion is unambiguous.
This Court does not need to re-examine the issue of whether
sudden is unambiguous.

"Sudden" cannot be defined, within the

exception to the pollution exclusion, without referring to "the
temporal element, specifically immediacy, abruptness, and
quickness."

Gridlev. 828 P.2d at 527.

The record clearly establishes, without dispute, that the
leak in question was formed as a result of an ongoing, gradual
process of corrosion.

Under such facts, Gridley requires that

this leak be found to be gradual, not sudden, in its inception.
In order to find this leak sudden, this Court would have to
abandon all logic and accept an unworkable and unrealistic
analytical framework.
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Clearly, this leak developed gradually, and its commencement
was gradual.

Thus, the pollution exclusion requires this Court

to affirm the trial court's dismissal of LaSal's complaint
against all the insurers.
DATED this y^x day of December, 1993.
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WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE POLLUTION
EXCLUSION CLAUSE CONTAINED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY PRECLUDES
COVERAGE TO ITS INSURED FOR LIABILITY FOR THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION THAT OCCURRED IN
THIS CASE.

CD

M

>
o
H

We have jurisdiction.

Art. V, | 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.

See also I

25.Q31, Fla. Stat. (1991)) Fla. R. App. P. 9.ISO.
O

The court of appeals set forth the following statement of

>-<
z
-m
>

facte and procedural history of this case for our consideration.
No. 79,293

OIMMITT CHEVROLET! INC., at al.,
Appellants,
vs.
SOUTHEASTERN FIDELITY INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Appellee.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING GRANTED
[July 1, 1993)
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before the Court on the following certified
question of law from the United States Court of Appeals in
Industrial Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships,
Inc._, 935 F.2d 240 (11th Cir. 1991)1

The following facts, taken from the
district court's opinion, Industrial Indem. Ins.
Co. v. Crown Auto-Dealerships/ 731 F. Supp.
1517, 1518-19 (M.D. Fla. 19$0), are undisputed.
Appellants Dimmltt Chevrolet, Inc. and Larry
Dimmltt Cadillac, Inc. ("Dimmltt") operated two
automobile dealerships. From 1974 through 1979,
Dimmltt sold the used crankcase oil generated by
its business to Peak Oil Company ("Peak*). From
1954 to 1979, Peak recycled the oil at its plant
in Hillsborough County, Florida for sale ae used
oil.
In 1983, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") determined that Peak's oil
operations had resulted in extensive soil and
groundwater pollution at and around the plant
site. Much of this pollution resulted from
Peak's placement of waste oil sludge in unllned
storage ponds. Chemicals from the sludge then
leached into the soil and groundwater. Some of
the pollution also derived from oil spills and
leaks at the site, including a 1978 incident in
which.a dike collapsed and allowed oily
wastewater to be released from a holding pond,
and the occasional runoff of contaminated
rainwater.
In July 1987, the EPA notified appellants
that a release of hazardous substances had
occurred at the Peak site and that appellants
were potentially responsible parties ("PRP") for
the costs of investigating and cleaning up the
pollution.• This liability is imposed, pursuant

- j -
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Southeastern owed no duty to defend or indemnify
Dimmitt under the CGL policy. Dimmitt filed a
counterclaim seeking a contrary declaration.
Both parties subsequently filed motions for
summary judgment. The district court.granted
summary judgment in favor of Southeastern,
reasoning that the pollution exclusion was not
ambiguous and that the word "sudden" should be
given a temporal meaning. Industrial Indem.
Ins. Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, 731 F. Supp.
1517 (M.D. Fla. 1990).Accordingly, the
district court ruled that the pollution at the
peak site occurred over a period of years and
therefore could not be considered "sudden." The
district court subsequently denied without
opinion Dimmitt's motion to alter or amend the
judgment.

to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1900
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. g 9607 et «eq.f on anyone
who venerates, transports, or~Hlsposes of
hazardous substances. In February 1999, Dimmitt
and other PRPs entered into two administrative
orders with EPA. Without conceding liability,
appellants agreed to undertake remedial measures
at the Peak site.
Appellee Southeastern Fidelity Insurance
Corporation ("Southeastern") provided .
comprehensive general liability ("CGL*)
insurance coverage to Dimmitt from 1972 through
1900. The policy covered Dimmitt
for all sums which the INSURED shall become
legally obligated to pay an DAMAGES because
of A. BODILY INJURY or B. PROPERTY DAMAGE #
to which this insurance applies, caused by
an occurrence, and the Company shall have
the right and duty to defend any suit
against the INSURED seeking DAMAGES on
account of such BODILY INJURY or PROPERTY
DAMAGE, even if any of the allegations of
the suit are groundless. . . .
An "occurrence" is defined by the policy as
an accident Including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which
result in BODILY INJURY or PROPERTY DAMAGE
neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the INSURED. . . •

Crown Auto, 935 F.2d at 241-42 (footnotes omitted).
As noted by the court of appeals, Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc.
(Dimmitt) was not the actual cause of the pollution damage at
issue.

Its liability, however, is not in dispute in this case.

The issue before us Is whether Dimmitt's comprehensive liability
Insurance policy was intended to cover hazardous* waste pollution
under the circumstances set forth in the court of appeals'
opinion.

The question turns bn the meaning of the term "sudden

and accidental4 within the pollution exclusion'clause of
However, the policy excluded coverage for
Dimmitt's policy.
BODILY INJURY or PROPERTY DAMAGE arising
out of the discharge, dispersal, release or
escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids,
or gases, waste materials . • • into or
upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water; but this
exclusion..does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental. . . .
In October I960, Southeastern filed a
declaratory judgment action against Dimmitt,
seeking a declaration by the district court that

Dimmitt asserts that the term "sudden and accidental" is
ambiguous because it is subject to multiple definitions.

Thus,

because ambiguous terms within an insurance policy should be
construed in favor of the insured, the policy should be construed
in Dimmitt's favor.

Dimmitt argues that the word "sudden" does

not have a temporal meaning and that the term was Intentionally

-4-
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written io as to provide coverage for unexpected and unintended

1970, the pollution exclusion clause at issue in this case was

pollution discharge.

added to the standard policy.

Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corporation (Southeastern)

Finally, the policy was again

changed in 1984 by the addition of what has been called an

contends that the clause excludes coverage for all pollution

"absolute exclusion clause," which totally excludes coverage for

except when the discharge or dispersal of the pollutant occurs

pollution clean-up costs that arise from governmental directives.

abruptly and accidentally.

Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability Insurance Law 161

As such, Southeaster* asserts that it

had no duty to defend or indemnify Dimmltt because the pollution
by the actual polluter, Peak Oil Company (Peak), was gradual and
occurred over a period of several years.

(1991).
Dimmltt argues that because many state insurance
commissioners approved the 1970 addition of the pollution,

Both sides also argue that the drafting history of

exclusion clause without ordering a reduction in premiums, this

pollution exclusion clauses favors their respective positions.

indicates that the clause did little more than clarify coverage.

In this regard, it should be noted that comprehensive general

Southeastern counters by saying that the reason there was no

liability (CGL) policies are standard insurance policlss

premium reduction in 1970 was because there had been no premium

developed by Insurance Industry trade associations, and these

Increase when the coverage was expanded in 1966 to cover

policies are the primary form of commercial insurance coverage

occurrences.

obtained by businesses throughout the country.

made by insurance representatives who had appeared before state

Before 1966, the

Both parties also rely on conflicting statements

standard CGL policy covered only property and personal Injury

Insurance commissions, as well as statements made by other

damage that was caused by "accident."

insurance experts.

Broadwell Realty Servs.,

Inc. v. Fidelity a Casualty Co., 528 A.2d 76, 84 (H.J. Super. Ct.
1987).

in 1966 the Insurance industry switched to "occurrence-

The policy language at issue here has been the subject of
extensive litigation throughout the United States.

There is

bated" policies in which the term "occurrence" was defined as

substantial support for both parties' positions.

*'«n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to

hand, the supreme courts of Colorado, Georgia, West Virginia, and

conditions, which results.in bodily injury or property damage

Wisconsin have found the pollution exclusion clause to be

neither expected nor Intended from the standpoint of the
insured.'"

Broadwell, 528 A.2d at 84 (quoting 3 Rowland H. Long,

The Law of Liability Insurance App»S3 (1966)).
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On the one

I
8

ambiguous.

in reaching their conclusions, these courts refer to

the varying dictionary definitions of the word "sudden."

They

He are persuaded that the federal district judge properly
construed Southeastern*s pollution exclusion clause.

The

are also persuaded by the drafting history that the words "sudden

ordinary and common usage of the term "sudden" Includes a

and accidental" were intended to mean "unexpected and

temporal aspect with a sense of immediacy or abruptness.

unintended."

stated by the court in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake

On the other hand, the supreme courts of Massachusetts,

As

Insurance Co., 597 H.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ohio 1992)i

Michigan, North Carolina, and Ohio have held that the word
"sudden" has a temporal context.*

As it la most commonly used, "sudden* means
happening quickly, abruptly, or without prior
notice. This la the plain and ordinary meaning
of the word, and the context in which it is
employed does not indicate that it should be
given any other meaning.

Therefore, when the word

"sudden" is combined with the word 'accidental,* the clause meana
abrupt and unintended.

A majority of federal courts of appeal

appear to have adopted this view in construing policies in states
See Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 480 N.w.2d
in which the supreme court of that state has not yet set forth
368 (Minn. App. 1992)(sudden meana the incident at issue occurred
Its position.
relatively quickly rather than gradually over a long period of
time).
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 911 P.2d 1003
(Colo. 199U; Clauaaan y. Aetna Casualty ft Sur. Co., 380 S.£.2d
686 (Ga. 1999)1 Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992)? just v. Land Reclamation Ltd., 456
N.w.2d 970 (Wis. 1990).
2
Lumbermen? Mut. Casualty v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.B.2d
56B (Mass. 1990); Upjohn v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N*W.2d
392 (Mich. 1991); Waste Management of the Carolina's, Inc. v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986); Hybud Equip. Corp.
v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.B.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992).
•«
•
E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 957 r.2d
11 jj (4th Cir.)(construing New Jersey law), cert, denied, 113 S.
Ct. 78, 121 L. Ed. 2d 42 {1992); Aetna Casualty 6 Sur. Co. v.
General Dynamics Corp., 9*8 F.2d 707 (dth Cir. 1992)(construing
Missouri lawn Hartford Accident ft Indem. Co* v. United States
Fidelity ft GuarTTo., 962 F.2d 1484 (lbth Cir.)(construing Utah
law), cert, denied, "113 S. Ct. 411, 121 L. Ed, 2d 335 (1992);
Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assoca., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.
199U(construing Pennsylvania law); A. Johnson a Co. v. Aetna
Casualty ft Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1991)(construing Maine
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law); New York v. AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 (2d Cir.
1991)(construing New York law); FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty ft
Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.)(construing Michigan law), cert,
denied, 111 S. Ct. 284, 112 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1990); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 875 F.2d 868 (6th
Cir. 1989)(construing Tennessee law by affirming without opinion
693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988)); United States Fidelity ft
Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc._, 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.
198d)(construing Kentucky law); Great Lakes Container Corp. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d io (1st Cir.
1984)(construing New Hampshire law). Contra CPC Int'l, Inc. v.
Northbrook Excess ft Surplus Ins. Co., $62 F.2d 77 (1st Cir.
1992)(also construing New Jersey law); New Castle County v.
Hartford Accident ft Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.
1991)(construing Delaware law).

Dimmltt points to dictionary definitions of-"sudden" which

"To read 'sudden and accidental' to mean only
unexpected and unintended is to rewrite the
policy by excluding one important pollution
coveraoe requirement—abruptness of the
pollution discharge. The very use of the words
'sudden and accidental1 reveal (sic] a clear
Intent to define the words differently, stating
two separate requirements. Reading 'sudden' in
its context, i.e. joined by the word 'and'.to
the word 'accident', the inescapable conclusion
is that 'sudden', even if including the concept
of unexpectedness, also adds an additional
element because 'unexpectedness' is already
expressed by '.accident.' This additional
element is the temporal meaning of sudden, i.e.
abruptness or brevity. To define sudden as
meaning only unexpected or unintended, and
therefore as a mere restatement of accidental,
would render the suddenness requirement mere
surplusage."

also Include the meaning of "happening or coming unexpectedly."
Dictionaries are helpful insofar as they set forth the ordinary,
usual meaning of words.

However, aa noted in New Castle County

v. Hartford Accident ft Indemnity Co.# dictionaries are •imperfect
yardsticks of ambiguity."

933 F.2d at 1193-94. Our duty is to

determine whether the word "sudden" is ambiguous in the context
of the specific Insurance policy at issue.
The use of the word "sudden" can connote, a sense of the
unexpected.

However, rather than standing alone in the pollution

<
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exclusion clause, it is an integral part of the conjunctive
phrase "sudden and accidental."

The term accidental is generally

understood to mean unexpected or unintended.

Hartford Accident ft

942 F.2d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 1991)(quoting Lower Paxton Township v.
United States Fidelity ft Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393, 402 (Pa. Super.

Indem. Co. v. United States fidelity ft Guar. Co.. 962 F.2d 1484

1989)).

(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 411, 121 L. Ed. 2d 335

sudden means-abrupt and unexpected.

(1992).

Therefore, to construe sudden also to mean unintended

As expressed in the pollution exclusion clause, the word

He reject Dimmltt'• suggestion that the policy is

and unexpected would render the words sudden and accidental

ambiguous because the term accident is Included both within the

entirely redundant.

definition of occurrence and in the pollution 'exclusion

This analysis is well stated in Northern

Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc.t

See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause
Through the Looking Glass,• 74 Geo. L.J. 1237, 1240 (1986), in
which the author laments that some courts have "ignored the
Insurers' Intent and distorted the phrase 'sudden and accidental'
beyond recognition. " He states that "courts have extended the
coverage of policies containing the pollution exclusion 'to mean
just what they choose it to mean.'" Id.

c

provision.

We concur with the response to this argument^stated

Our conclusion that sudden has a temporal dimension when used
in conjunction with the term accidental is consistent with this
Court'8 precedent in construing the statutory definition of
sudden accident in workers' compensation cases. Splyey v.
Battaglla Fruit Co., 138 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1962); Meehan v.
Crowder, 158 ria. 361, 28 So. 2d 435 (1946).
Likewise, we also reject the dissenters' argument that the term
"sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion clause should
be given the same interpretation as certain courts have construed

.10-

rn •

in.United States Fidelity I Guaranty Co. v.- Star Fire Coals*
Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988)i
We do not find the pollution clause to be
riddled with ambiguities despite the best
efforts of Star Fire to create them.
Specifically, we believe the district court
erred when it treated the pollution exclusion
and the "occurrence" definition provisions as
interchangeable. Though the district court
recognized that the issue before it was "whether
Star Fire's release of coal dust falls within
the policy exclusion provision," the court
failed to explicate the language of the
exclusion and ruled in favor of Star Fire on the
basis of the "occurrence" definition. We have
no difficulty reconciling the two provisions.
We believe the "occurrence" definition results
in a policy that provides coverage for
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions
•causing damages in all cases except those
involving pollution, where coverage is limited
to those situations where the discharge was
"sudden and accidental." We fully agree with
the conclusion that this "language is clear and
plain, something only a lawyer's Ingenuity could
make ambiguous." American Motorists Insurance
Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 r. Supp. 1423 (D.
Kan. 1987). "It's strange logic to perceive

ambicuity" in this clause. Waste Management of
Carolines, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co., 3l5'

M.c. »S0/34u i.i.ldlU

(1966).

In the final analysis, we construe this policy to mean
that (1) basic coverage arises from the occurrence of unintended
damages, but (2) such damages as arise from the discharge of
various pollutants are excluded from the basic coverage, except
that (3) damages arising from the discharge of these pollutants
will fall within the coverage of the policy where such discharge
is sudden and accidental.

See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle

<
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Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct.
78, 121 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1992).
Because we conclude that the policy language is
unambiguous, we find it inappropriate and unnecessary to consider
the arguments pertaining to the drafting history of the pollution
exclusion clause.
Applying the policy language to the facts of this case, we

rn-

hold that the pollution damage was not within the scope of
the term in boiler and machinery policies. The most obvious flaw
in this argument is that it ascribes universal meaning to^the
phrase "sudden and accidental" regardless of the context of its
use. Significantly, boiler and machinery policies provide
coverage for damage that is sudden and accidental; Southeastern's
pollution exclusion applies the phrase to the causative agent—
the discharge. Further, we note that the Massachusetts Supreme
Court specifically rejected its own prior decision in New gnaland
Gas & Electric A n ' n v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., lift
N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1953), the lead case relied upon by the
dissenters, as authority for compelling the sudden and accidental
language in pollution exclusion clauses to be construed in the
same manner as in boiler and machinery policies. Lumbermens Mut.
Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass.
T990).

• 11-

Southeastern*s policy.

The pollution took place over a period of

many years and moat of it occurred gradually.

With respect to

r

the pollution which resulted from oil spills and leaks at the
site as well as from occasional runoff of contaminated rain

(

water, we agree with the analysis of the federal district judge

/

in this case when he saidt

c

These spills and leaks appear to be common
place events which occurred in the course of
daily business, and therefore cannot, as a

•12-

matter of law, be classified aa "sudden and
accidental.• That is, theae "occasional
accidental spills" are recurring events that
took place in the usual course of recycling the
oil. As one court observedi "contamination
. . . by disposing of chemicals in the lagoon,
or by annual careless spillage onto the ground
surface cannot be sudden; or unexpected and
accidental . . •" American Mutual Liability
Ins. v, Neville Chemical, 650 F. Supp. 929, 933
(W.P. Pa. 1987)1 Grant^Southern Iron* Metal Co.
v. CNA Insurance Co., 469 F. Supp. 798 (B.D.
Mich. 1986)(polluting air emissions caused by
the sporadic or continuous break down of
pollution equipment were not sudden and
accidental).

GRJJMES, j», concurring.
I originally concurred with the position of the
dissenters in this case.

Z have now become convinced that I

relied too much on what was said to be the drafting history of
the pollution exclusion clauae and perhaps subconsciously upon

f

the 'social premise that I would rather have insurance companies
cover these losses rather than parties such as Dimmltt who did
not actually cause the pollution damage.

r

In so doing, I departed

from the basic rule of interpretation that language should be
Industrial Indem. Ins. v. Crown Auto Dealerships. 731 F. Supp.

given its plain and ordinary meaning.

1317, 1521 (M.D. Fia. 1990).

wrench the words "sudden and accidental" to mean "gradual and

See also Lumbermens Mut. Casualty

Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc.. 555 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 1990).
We answer the certified question in the affirmative and
return the record to the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
M C D O N A L D , SHAW and

v accidental,"

this case.

c

Try as I will, I cannot

which must be done in order to provide coverage in

i

K O G A N , J J . , concur.

GRIMES, J., concurs with an opinion.
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BARKBTT, C.J. and
HARDING, J., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
FILED, DETERMINED.

n

c
A

O
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Overton, J., dissenting.
t dissent.

In my view, the majority!

(1) ignores key

factors in determining that the term "sudden and accidental,* as
used in comprehensive liability insurance policies, is not
ambiguous; (2) fails to consider the facts in this record
concerning the Intent of the Insurance Industry in using that
term and, consequently, is wrong on the merits; and (3) allows
the insurance industry to grossly abuse the rehearing process in
the presentation of its rehearing petition in this cause.

"sudden and accidental" in boiler and machinery policies, one
treatise states the following;
In order for the insured to recover under a
boiler and machinery policy it must demonstrate
that the occurrence was "sudden and accidental."
Although the terms "sudden* and "accidental"
seem to imply that the immediate or
instantaneous event must occur, courts have
construed these terms more broadly. Utilising
the "common meaning" doctrine, the courts have
uniformly held that the dictionary definition of
the terms as "unforeseen, unexpected and
unintentional" is controlling.
Stephen A. Cozen, Insuring Real Property, | 5.03(2)(b) (1989)

The Definition of "Sudden and Accidental"
The majority's reasoning blatantly ignores evidence before
this Court reflecting that the term "sudden and accidental" is
ambiguous.

The term "sudden and accidental" has been in use by

(footnotes omitted)*

Similarly, Professor Couch in his treatise

states the following!
When coverage is limited to a sudden "breaking•
of machinery the word "sudden" should be given
its primary meaning as a happening without

the Insurance industry in standard form insurance policies since
before 1970.

In those policies, "sudden and accidental* has been

defined differently from the definition asserted in this case by
Southeastern.

For Instance, in policies involving boilers and

machinery, courts have uniformly found the term "sudden and
iccidental" to be defined as "unforeseen or unexpected" (the
definition asserted by Olmmltt), aw opposed to "Instantaneous or
ibrupt" (the definition asserted by Southeastern). The law is
laar and unrefuted on this point.

In explaining the meaning of

See, s.g., New England Gas & Elec. Ass'n v. Ocean Accident &
aarT Corp,, 116 N.E.2d 671, 680 (Mass. 1953)(defining the word
sudden" within the terra "sudden and accidental" in a boiler and

machinery policy as "a happening without previous notice or with
very brief notice, or as something coming or occurring
unexpectedly, unforeseen, or unprepared for"); Anderson fc
Mlddleton Lumber Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 377 P.2d
938, 941 (Wash. 1959)^the word "sudden" within the term "sudden
and accidental" in boiler and machinery policy, construed to mean
"unforeseen and unexpected," not instantaneous"). See also
Sutton Drilling Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 335 F. 2d~fTo7~Bl4 (5th
Cir. 1944) (finding it was undisputed that the word "sudden," 4kB
used in oil well Insurance policy, means "happening without
previous notice or with very brief notice; unforeseen; rapid. 1:
does not mean instantaneously."). After 1970, courts continued
to similarly construe the term "sudden and accidental" in boiler
and machinery policies. See, e.g., Community Fed. Sav. fc Loan
Ass'n v* Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection t ins. Co., 580
F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (CO...Mo. 1984) (three separate motor failures
of one motor over a seven-month period found to be "sudden and
accidental"); Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 931,
934 (W.O. Pa. 1973) (relying on dictionary definition, court
determined that "sudden" means "happening or coming
unexpectedly").
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previous notice, or as something coming or
occurring unexpectedly, as unforeseen or
unprepared for. That lsf "sudden" is not to be
construed as synonymous with Instantaneous. "~~
George J. Couch, 10A Couch on Ins* Law 2d f 42i396 (rev. ed.
1982) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis, added).

In fact, in one case

three separate failures of one motor over a seven-month period
ware found to be "sudden and accidental."

Community Fed. Sav. ft

Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection ft Ins. Co., 580
p. Supp. 1170 (B.D. Mo. 1984).

The simple fact that the tern

"sudden and accidental" has been defined differently in other

For the majority to

assert otherwise/ in my view, defies logic and common sense and
is legally unjustified.

Random House Dictionary gives the primary meaning as "happening,
coming, made, or done quickly."

456 N.N.2d at 973.

Random House

gives "sudden" the secondary meaning of "an unexpected occasion
or occurrence."

The Random House Dictionary of the English

Language (2d ed. 1987).
The Georgia Supreme Court likewise noted the differences
in the definition of that tern atid the variances of its primary
and secondary meanings in the dictionaries, statingi

"But, on

reflection one realises that even in its popular usage, 'sudden'

insurance policies is sufficient to support a finding of
ambiguity as to the term's definition here.

foreseen," and a secondary meaning as "prompt," whereas, the

A majority of other state supreme courts

does not usually describe the duration of an event, but rather
its unexpectednessi
sudden death."

a sudden storm, a sudden turn in the road,

Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688.

The court explained

that "(e)ven when used to describe the onset of the event, the
that have considered this issue agree with my position.

See
word has an elastic temporal connotation that varies with

Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo.
expectations."

id•

1991)i Claussen v. Aetna Casualty ft Sur. Co.. 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga.
1989)i Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co,, 607 N.E.2d
1204 (111. 1992)i Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 421 S.B.2d 493 (H. Va. 1992); Just v. Land Reclamation,

to be ambiguous given that the term is, in fact, subject to more
than one interpretation.

Although the insurance Industry asks

that we find the term to be unambiguous, it is clear that the

Ltd., 456 M.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1990).
In determining whether the term was ambiguous , the
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that even dictionaries differ
on the meaning of the term "sudden."

In my view, the term "sudden and accidental" must be found

That court noted that

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986) gives the

term can mean "unexpected and unintended," a definition not
limited as to time of occurrence, in addition to Southeastern*s
asserted definition of "Instantaneous or abrupt."

This is

especially true when considering the extreme divergence among the
numerous jurisdictions considering this issue.

As noted, even

primary meaning of "sudden" as "occurring unexpectedly .. • . not
dictionaries cannot agree as to the primary and secondary

-17-
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meanings of the word "sudden.•

Notably, however, perhaps the

most important illustration of this ambiguity is the definition
that the Insurance industry itself embraced in regulatory
presentations.

An examination of the pollution exclusion clause

th* 1970s revision.

Id^s Stephen L. Llebo, 7A Appleman's

Insurance Law and Practice S 4499.05 (8upp. 1991).
Before 1966, the standard comprehensive general liability
policy covered only property and personal Injury damage that was

drafting history set forth below unquestionably supports the

caused by "accident."

conclusion that the clause was Included only to preclude coverage

4 Casualty Co. of New York, 528 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct.

for Intentionally caused pollution damage, not to preclude damage

1987); Just, 456 N.H.2d at 574.

that was "unexpected and unintended."

undefined in policies, and courts reached differing conclusions

The Drafting History of Comprehensive General
Liability Policies and the Pollution Exclusion Clause
Comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies are

Broadwell Realty Serve., Inc. v. Fidelity

The term "accident" was

MB to' exactly what type of damage was covered.

In defining the

term "accident," most courts agreed that the term referred to
damage caused by an unintentional or unexpected event.

But some

standard Insurance policies developed by insurance Industry trade

found that damage caused by gradual pollution was covered, while

associations, and these policies are the primary form of

others did not.

commercial Insurance coverage obtained by businesses throughout
the country.

CGL policies have been revised in pertinent part on

three separate occasionsi
1970s and mid-1980s.

0

first in 1966, than again in the early

Just, 456 N.W.2d at 573-74; Brooke

Jackson, Liability Insurance for Pollution Claimsi

Avoiding a

Litigation wasteland, 26 Tulsa L.J. 209, 224 (1990).

The

Just, 456 N.H.2d at 574.

To clarify this confusion, in 1966 the insurance Industry
switched from "accident-based" comprehensive general liability
policies to "occurrence-based" policies.

Kenneth S. Abraham,

Environmental Liability Insurance Law 155 (1991).

In the

occurrence-baaed comprehensive general liability policy, the term
"occurrence" was defined as "*an accident, including continuous

pollution exclusion clause, the clause at issue in this

or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily

proceeding, was included as a standard clause in CGL policies in

injury or property damage neither expected nor Intended from the
standpoint of the insured.'"

Broadwell, 528 A.2d at 84 (emphasis

added)(quoting 3 Rowland H. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance

8

In 1984 the industry proposed what has been called an "absolute
pollution exclusion clause.1* The new clause completely
eliminates the term "sudden and accidental" and totally excludes
coverage for pollution clean-up costs that arise from
governmental directives. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental
Liability Insurance Law 161 (1991).

19-

App-53 (1966)).
Statements by the Insurance industry at that time Indicate
that the shift to an occurrence-based CGL policy was to "clarify
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the, coverage provided by liability policies, and to avoid the

to.take reasonable precautions to prevent pollution would not be

confusion resulting from courts attempting to distinguish between

afforded coverage.

accidental means and accidental results••

statedt

Grand River Lime Co.

v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 289 N.B.2d 360, 364 (Ohio Ct. App*.
1972).

Additionally, the shift was to clearly indicate that the

terri "occurrence" Included damages caused by "'exposure to
conditions which may [have] continue[d] for an unmeasured period
of time.'*

Broadwell, 528 A.2d at 84 (quoting 3 Rowland H. Long,

The Law of Liability Insurance A P P - S 3 (1966)).

For instance,

Lyman Baldwin, Secretary-Underwriting, Insurance Company of North
America, made this statement regarding coverages
"Let us consider how this would apply in a
fairlyrcommonplace situation where we have a
chemical manufacturing plant, which, during the
course of its operations, emits noxious fumes
that damage the paint on buildings in the
surrounding neighborhood. Under the new
(occurrence-based) policy, there is coverage
until such time as the Insured becomes aware
that the damage was being done."
Just, 456 N.W.2d at 574 (quoting George Pendygraft, et al., Who
Pays for Environmental Damaget

Recent Developments In CERCLA

Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 Ind. L. Rev. 117,
141 (1988)).

CGL policies to Include the pollution exclusion clause at issue

S\

Dlmmltt.

"Coverage for pollution or contamination
is not provided in most cases under present
policies because damages can be said* to be
expected or intended and thus are excluded by
the definition of occurrence. The above
exclusion clarifies this situation so as to
avoid any question of Intent. Coverage is
continued for pollution or contaminatiofiTcauaed
injuries when the pollution or contamination
results from an accident '. . . ."
Just, -456 N.W.2d at 575 (emphasis added)(quoting James T. Price,
Evidence Supporting Policyholders ln Insurance Coverage Disputes,
Nat. Resources a Env't, Spring 1988, at 17, 48). Emphasising the
view that it was not Intended to reduce coverage, The Flref
Casualty a Surety Bulletin, a bulletin used by Insurance agents
end brokers in interpreting policy provisions, statedi
"In one important respect, the exclusion simply
reinforces the definition of occurrence. That
is, the policy states that it will not cover
claims where the 'damage was expected or
intended' by the Insured and the exclusion
states, in effect, that the policy will cover
incidents which are"sudden and accidental—
unexpected and not intended."
Just, 456 N.W.2d at 575 (emphasis added)(quoting Sheldon Hurwitz

On March 17, 1970, the Industry again proposed to amend

ln

For example, the Insurance Rating Board

When the pollution exclusion clause was proposed,

a Dan D. Kohane, The Love Canal—Insurance Coverage for
Environmental Accidents. 50 Ins. Couns. J. 378, 379 (1983)).
In determining whether to approve the new clause, the West]

representatives of the Industry indicated that the new clause was

Virginia insurance commissioner held a hearing to determine the

not designed to reduce coverage; instead, it was to ensure that

meaning of the term "sudden and accidental."

insureds who recklessly and intentionally polluted or who failed

concern was that the clause would reduce coverage but not reduce

-21-
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The commissioner's

rates.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer

made the following findings!

the clause's inclusion would have no effect on the vast majority
of risks.

The [insurance] companies and rating
organizations have represented to the Insurance
Commissioner, orally and in writing, that the
proposed exclusions . . « are merely
clarifications of existing coverages as defined
and limited in the definitions of the term
'occurrence*, contained in the respective
policies to which said exclusions would be
attached.

Id.

Likewise, the State of Florida, as an amicus curiae in
this cause, hae asserted that representations similar to those
made to West Virginia's insurance commissioner were made to it at
the time the industry sought approval of the clause in Florida.
The State additionally noted that, had insurers submitted the

In re Pollution and Contamination Exclusion Findings. W. Va.

clause as one limiting coverage, Florida and other states would

Dept. of Xns. Order 70-4 (August 19, 1970)*

likely not have approved the clause without a simultaneous rate

The Supreme Court of

west Virginia recently addressed the issue and stated the
insurance industry had engaged "in studied, affirmative and
official communications with a regulatory authority of the State
-

of West Virginia.

Joy Technologies, 421 S.E.2d at 497. In

those communications,

reduction.
The drafting history of the pollution exclusion clause
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the insurance Industry
was attempting to exclude from coverage those polluters who
committed their acts intentionally.

the Insurance group representing (the Insurer in
the case at issue] unambiguously and officially
represented to the West Virginia Insurance
Commission that the exclusion in question did
not alter coverage under the policies involved,
coverage which Included the injuries in the
present case. This Court must conclude that the
policies Issued by ftKe insurer] covered
pollution damage, even If it resulted over a
period of time and was gradual, so long as It
was not expected or intended.
Id. at 499-50 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Georgia in its decision noted that

The record of

representations by the Insurance Industry itself clearly support
this conclusion.

The addition of the pollution exclusion clause,

specifically tne term "sudden and accidental" was presented by
the insurance industries to the regulators to <mean that coverage
would continue for those events that were "unexpected and
unintended*} the clause's purpose was simply to make clear that
intentionally committed pollution would not be covered.
Four state supreme courts have construed the term "sudden

the insurance rating board made similar representations to its

and accidental* to be clear and unambiguous, holding that the

insurance commissioner by stating that the pollution exclusion

common, everyday understanding of the term "sudden" is a

clause was intended to shut out only intentional polluters.

happening done quickly, without warning, unexpectedly, or

Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 689;

abruptly.

Additionally, the board stated that

-23-

Lumbermena Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus.,
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Inc., 533 N.B.2d 56B (Mass. 1990); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire

Judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that an eighteen-month

Ins. Co., 476 M.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991); Waste Management, Inc. v.

leak was not "sudden and accidental."

Peerless Ins. Co., 340 8.E.2d 374 (fl.C. 1986)| Hybud Equip. Corp.

and remanded that determination, stating that the issue of

v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992).

whether the damage was sudden and accidental turned on how the

Hone of

The Supreme Court reversed

these courts, however, have addressed representations by the

accident itself occurred rather than whether the damage caused by

Industry regarding its intentions in Including the tern "sudden

t M accident was sudden and accidental.

and accidental" in the pollution exclusion clause and none have

leak was caused by a sudden and accidental puncture, then the

acknowledged that the industry itself has construed and applied

damage resulting from that leak was covered under the policy even

this term differently in other Insurance policies.

if the damage Itself occurred over a long period to time.

In my view,

For instance, if the

Under

the failure to consider these representations in determining the

this rationale, it would still be necessary to remand the instant

meaning of "sudden and accidental" is unjustified.

case for a determination of whether the damage at issue was

I would hold

that the insurance Industry contemplated no change in coverage

sudden and accidental.

except in those Instances where damage was caused by
Improper Grounds for Granting Rehearing

Intentionally committed acts of pollution, and, consequently,
that "unexpected and unintentional" damage is covered under the

Finally, I believe that the majority's opinion allows
Southeastern to grossly abuse the rehearing process because the

term "sudden and accidental."
Interestingly, even though the Massachusetts Supreme Court
in Lumbermens held that "sudden and accidental,4 had a temporal

contents of the petition for rehearing in this case are improper.
Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330, a motion for
rehearing shall not be used to re-argue the merits of a court's

meaning, its consideration of that term in a later case would
decision.

In this case not only does Southeastern totally

still require that the summary judgment in the instant case be
reargue legal Issues previously considered by this Court, it also
reversed and remanded.

In Goodman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
seeks to Improperly present "newly discovered evidence."

Co., 593 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1992), the Massachusetts Supreme Court
reviewed a case in which the damage at issue under the pollution
exclusion clause was caused by a gradual leak.

Damage caused as

a result of the leak occurred over an eighteen-month period of
time.

The trial court, based on Lumbermens, had Issued summary
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See, for example, the Circuit Court of Appeals* notation that
at least some of the damage at Issue was caused by a 1978
incident in which a dike collapsed and allowed oily wastewater to
be released from a holding pond. Crown Auto, 935 F.2d at 241.
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the extrinsic evidence, and in fact did
respond, in their Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.
Finally, at least some of the evidence was
discussed in opinions cited by the district
court in its order granting summary judgment.
See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Caa. 6 Sur. Co.,

Southaaatarn contanda that its "new" avidanca ia admiaaibia to
rebut axtrinaic avidanca tubmittad by Oimmitt.
I would strike Southeastern'* "new avidanca" for two
reasons.

First, the evidence submitted by Oimmitt was properly

made part of the record in this proceeding.

The Circuit Court

for .the Eleventh Circuit specifically noted that the record in
this case properly included extrinsic evidence submitted by

It

further noted that Southeastern had an opportunity to respond to
the evidence submitted by Oimmitt*

It statedt

We conclude that the record properly
includes the extrinsic evidence submitted by
Dlmmltt regarding the drafting history of the
pollution exclusion clause and the intent of
the Insurance companies. Appellee argues that
such extrinsic evidence is not properly a part
of the record on appeal because much of it was
proffered with the post-trial motion to alter
or amend and was thus untimely. Under the
circuits tancea of this case, it waa appropriate
for Oimmitt to proffer the evidence in
connection with the motion to alter or amend.
The district court ruled that the .evidence was
discoverable in a February 8, 1990 order* The
parties' pretrial stipulation contemplated that
the issue of admissibility of the evidence
would be decided at a motion In limine.
However, the district court granted summary
judgment prior to the date set for trial.
Dlmmltt reasonably planned to argue for
admissibility of the evidence at a motion ir\
limine, rather than in a supplemental briet in
connection with the pending summary judgment
motions, because the district court's
February 8, 1990 order denied motions by
certain other auto dealerships to file
supplemental briefs in support of their crossmotions for summary judgment. Furthermore,
Southeastern had an opportunity to respond to
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Industrial Indem. Ins. Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc., 935
F.2d 240, 243 n.3. (11th Cir. 1991)(references to record
omitted).

Dlmmltt Chevrolet regarding the drafting history of the pollution
exclusion clause and the intent of the insurance companies.

5?5 GaT333, 390 £.E.2d 595 (1959)'.

Consequently, the extrinsic evidence submitted by

Oimmitt may properly be considered by this Court.
Second, the evidence Southeastern now asks this Court to
consider is not new—it is a drafting and regulatory history of
the policy at issue aa compiled by Transamerlca Insurance
Company.

Transamerlca sought to file this history in an amicus

brief in this proceeding.
was rejected by this Court*

However, the brief was late-filed and
Southeastern now soaks to admit

Transamerlca's compilation by incorporating that compilation into
ita rehearing petition, claiming it la "new evidence."

This

history was readily available to Southeastern during the course
of this proceeding/ and it is improper to allow them to
circumvent procedural rules of this Court by permitting
submission of that evidence at this time.
Given that the evidence being submitted by Southeastern is
now inadmissible and given that a significant portion of
Southeastern's argument in the petition makes reference to that
evidence, I believe that the rehearing petition is improper under
the rules and should be stricken.
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Consideration of the rehearing

petition in its present font makes a mockery of the rehearing
rule and effectively signals the bar. that "anything goes."
Apparently, the insurance industry has sought a proverbial second
bite at the apple and won*
BARKETT, C.J. and HARDING, J., concur.
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